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In all prosecutions for arson there are two elements of the alleged
crime, which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That the fire was caused by the willful criminal act of some person; and (2) the identity of defendant as the one responsible for the
fire. Both of these elements may be established by direct or positive
evidence or by circumstantial evidence or both.
A conviction may be sustained although there is no direct evidence
of the guilt of the accused. As in other criminal cases, one may be convicted of arson on circumstantial evidence. Whether the evidence is
direct or circumstantial, the same broad rule applies, and that rule
requires the proof to show the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Arson is one of those crimes which is peculiarly of secret
preparation and commission. It is very seldom that the prosecution can
furnish testimony of an eye witness who observed the setting of the
fire. If it required positive testimony to convict in cases of arson, it
would be next to impossible ever to procure a conviction, for it is a
crime committed under cover of darkness, and when there is no human
eye to see. To hold, therefore, that no man could be convicted unless
the state is able to establish by an eye witness that he set the fire would
make a dead letter of the statute.
The very nature of the crime is such that it becomes necessary for
the state, in many, if not in most cases, to rely upon circumstantial
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. It is judic;ally recognized
that a well directed train of circumstances may be as satisfactory as
an array of direct evidence, and in some cases more so. Although many
of the items of the evidence, when standing alone, are of little consequence, they may, when considered as a whole, point strongly to the
guilt of the accused. The rule seems to be that wheii circumstantial
evidence is relied on for conviction, the circumstanct-o. %hIen taken
together, must be of a conclusive nature and tendency, leading on the
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whole to a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no one
else committed the offense.
Direct or positive evidence is evidence to the precise point in issue;
as, in a prosecution for arson, that a witness saw the accused set the
fire, or, in cashe of homicide, that a witness saw the accused inflict the
blow which caused death, or, in case of an agreement, that a witness
was present and witnessed it. Documents, which are genuine, are considered as direct evidence. Some courts hold that a confession obtained
by police officers or other public authorities or private individuals is
direct evidence, but other courts hold the contrary and say that a confession is rather a fact to be proved by evidence than evidence to prove
a fact. All courts seem to be in agreement, however, that a confession
or admission given in any judicial proceeding, such as a preliminary
hearing, coroner's inquest, or where defendant pleads guilty in court,
constitutes direct or positive evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of other
facts than the fact in issue, which by experience have been found so
associated with that fact that in the relation of cause and effect they
lead to a satisfactory conclusion. For example, when footprints are
discovered after a recent snow, it is proper to infer that some animated
being passed over the snow since it fell; and from the form and number
of the footprints it can be determined whether they are those of a man,
a bird, or an animal. Such evidence, therefore, is founded on experience, observed facts, and coincidences establishing a connection between
the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. Other
examples are: (1) Saturation of the premises with gasoline, kerosene,
or other inflammable liquid, if not normally kept upon the premises;
(2) two or more fires, each separate and distinct, having no connection with each other; (3) a person seen entering or leaving the premises just before the fire; (4) removal of furniture, fixtures, or stock
from the premises prior to the fire; (5) a false alibi; and (6) flight of
defendant after the crime was committed.
A code definition is as follows: Direct evidence is that which proves
the fact in dispute directly without any inference or presumption, and
which, if itself true, conclusively establishes the fact. Indirect or circumstantial evidence is that which tends to establish the fact in dispute
by proving another, and which, though true, does not of itself conclusively establish that fact, but which affords an inference or presumption
of its existence. Direct evidence is that which immediately points at
the question at issue. Indirect, or circumstantial, evidence is that which
only tends to establish the issue in proof of various facts, sustaining,
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by their consistency, the question at issue. Another definition has thus
been formulated. Direct evidence differs from circumstantial, in this,
that in the former witnesses testify directly of their own knowledge of
the main facts to be proven, while the latter is the proof of certain
facts and circumstances in a case from which the jury may infer other
connected facts which usually and reasonably follow according to
common experience,
Direct and circumstantial evidence are not different in their nature.
For, as Wharton says, "All evidence consists of reason and fact cooperating as coordinate factors." Circumstantial evidence is merely direct
evidence indirectly applied. Direct and circumstantial evidence are not,
in any sense, opposed to each other. In fact, they are in practice found
in the most intimate connection with each other. Each of these modes
of proof has its advantages and disadvantages.
There exists in the minds of many persons a strong prejudice against
circumstantial evidence, and as evidence in arson cases is very frequently
entirely of this character, it is important that a true understanding of
the weight and value of circumstantial evidence be had.
The chief error with regard to the delusiveness of circumstantial
evidence lies in considering it as a mode of reasoning or proving doubtful points peculiar to a court of justice. Whereas it is nothing else than
the common course of settling all questions which can be settled by
argument employed whether knowingly or unknowingly by all mankind. If men would stop to consider the fact that in the ordinary affairs
of every day life they are continually forming judgment on circumstantial evidence alone and acting upon these judgments in all matters of
the utmost concern to them, they would be less likely to decry this kind
of evidence when acted upon in the administration of justice.
In a legal sense circumstantial evidence is not regarded as inferior
to direct evidence. In many instances, reliance may be had on it more
safely than on direct evidence, especially since proof by circumstantial
evidence usually requires the use of a large number of witnesses, each
testifying to some small link. Thus, a number of perjured witnesses
would be necessary to cause an unjust conviction, whereas one perjured
witness giving direct testimony might accomplish this wrongful act.
In one case the court in delivering a charge to the jury pointed out
the advantages of circumstantial evidence as follows:
"In most cases of conviction on circumstantial evidence, there are many different witnesses swearing to several distinct circumstances, all tending to the same
result, each of which circumstances is a necessary link in the chain of evidence
required to produce a conviction ; and there is, therefore, the less danger of perjury
in such cases because of the number of perjured witnesses which it would be
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necessary for the prosecution to produce to effect an unjust conviction. For if
one perjured witness should swear to a fact forming only one link in a chain
of circumstances, the rest of the witnesses being honest, he will be in danger of
detection from the discrepancy between his testimony and theirs. Whereas, if a
person testified that he saw the crime committed, but in fact did not, there is a
possibility that his false testimony may never be detected. For this reason,
although from the imperfection and uncertainty which must ever exist in human
tribunals, I have no doubt that there have been cases in which innocent persons
have been convicted' on circumstantial evidence, yet from my knowledge of
criminal jurisprudence, both from reading and from observation, I have no
hesitation in expressing the opinion that where there has been one unjust conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone, there have been three innocent persons
condemned upon the positive testimony of perjured witnesses."
"Indeed, it has been many times observed that strong circumstantial evidence
of arson, and other crimes committed in secret, is the most satisfactory of any
to point to the guilt of the accused; for men may be seduced to perjury by many
base motives, to which the secret nature of the offense may sometimes afford a
temptation, but it can scracely happen with many witnesses, especially if they
be such over which the accused could have no control."
Circumstantial evidence is often used as an aid to, and frequently as
a test of, direct evidence. If circumstantial evidence were to be excluded
in criminal cases, the great majority of criminals would go unpunished.
Certain cases to be found in the books in which innocent persons were

convicted on circumstantial evidence have at times been called to your
attention. These, however, are few in number, and they occurred in a
period of some hundreds of years. The wonder is that there have not
been more. They are constantly resorted to in capital trials to frighten
juries into a belief that there should be no conviction on merely circumstantial evidence. But the law exacts a conviction wherever there is
legal evidence to show the guilt of the accused to a moral certainty and
beyond a reasonable doubt; and circumstantial evidence is legal evidence.
Frequently persons examined as to their qualifications to serve as
jurors, particularly in capital cases, say that they could not conscientiously find the accused guilty on evidence that is wholly circumstantial.
The existence of this feeling is no doubt due to a large extent to the
prejudicial statements made by counsel for the accused, in almost every
case where the proof of guilt depends upon circumstantial evidence, to
throw discredit upon this kind of evidence. The courts have, however,
very rarely shared in or encouraged this popular prejudice against
circumstantial evidence.

In one instance the Supreme Court of the United States had this to
say regarding circumstantial evidence:
"Great latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence, the aid
of which is constantly required and, therefore, where direct evidence of the fact
is wanting, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and circumstances
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the more correct their judgment is likely to be. The modern tendency, both
of legislation and of the decision of courts, is to give as wide a scope as possible
to the investigation of facts."
Circumstantial evidence may be divided into two groups. This evidence may be compared with a chain, which by the number and strength
of its links may furnish adequate proof of guilt, but which is no
stronger than its weakest link. Or it may be likened to a rope or cable
composed of different strands; and then its vitality depends on the
aggregate strength of the strands, which is only partially affected by a
weak element. The chain is composed of interdependent links; the rope
or cable is built up by independent strands which are bound together.
If one essential link in the chain is missing, the evidence may be insufficient to justify a finding of guilt. A defective strand in the rope may
weaken the case, but it may nevertheless, remain sufficiently strong to
sustain a conviction. Each one of these strands, separated from the
others, may be easily broken; but when all are united, woven together,
and point in one direction, they form a cable sufficiently strong to
convict.
For instance, a case occurred in which the defendant was convicted
of arson and he appealed to the State Supreme Court on the ground
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. On the
evening of .the fire, which totally destroyed a barn, the owner herded
his horses and cattle into the barn and because of an approaching storm,
took particular care to see that the doors were dosed. About 3:00
A.M. the owner and his wife were awakened by the glare from the
burning barn, which was involved in flames, and nothing could be done
to save the imprisoned animals. They did, however, notice that the
large sliding door was slid back some two or three feet. At daylight
the owner and his four sons and two neighbors started looking for
tracks. They found tracks of smooth rubber shoes on the road near
the barn; also kinks in the fence between the road and the barn indicating a person had stepped on it in going over. These tracks were
traced to within six rods of defendant's dwelling. When the defendant
noticed the tracking party he ran into the house and did not come out,
but no one in the party went up to the house or made any attempt to
speak to him.
About a year before the fire defendant lost a lawsuit he had brought
against the owner for alleged damage done by the latter's cows. Soon
after the decision of that case, in a casual conversation, defendant made
the statement that he would "get even with the owner," and at another
time that he would "lick hell out of him."
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One of the tracking party traced one of the footprints upon a paper.
When the constable arrested the defendant he found in the defendant's
house one rubber shoe which seemed to fit the tracing.
In reversing defendant's conviction the State Supreme Court pointed
out the rather weak and missing links in the evidence, as follows:
"(1) With reference to the large barn door, which had been closed the
evening of the fire, ind which was found at the time of the fire pushed
back on its rollers about two feet, permitting the inference that someone had entered and set the fire, it is not impossible that the-movement
of the door might be ascribed to the draft created by the flames, or to
the expansion of the roller rails from the heat as the fire had raged for
some time before this condition was discovered. (2) It had rained during the night, but ,the evidence is silent as to the absence or presence of
lightning during the storm. We do know that sometimes lightning does
set fire to buildings. (3) The existence of a motive is extremely doubtful. Statements casually made while smarting under a recent adverse
decision of a lawsu'it are generally of no significance. There is no evidence that defendant ever again referred to the matter. (4) The only
substantial evidence pointing to the defendant as the guilty party is the
existence of footprints showing that some person passed both ways
between the barn and defendant's residence. A paper tracing was made
of one of these footprints. The constable testified that a rubber shoe
was found in defendant's possession which seemed to fit the tracing.
The fact is, however, that the rubber shoe was in possession of the
state at the time of the trial, but was not produced. Its nonproduction
almost compels the inference that it would not fit the tracing and leaves
very little force to the evidence of footprints. Footprints may be convincing evidence, but to be such they must be shown to correspond with
the foot or footwear of the accused.
There is no doubt that circumstantial evidence alone may sufficiently
establish the Corpus Delicti and the guilt of the defendant in an arson
conviction, but in this case, as the court pointed out, it was insufficient
to sustain the conviction. 1
In another case a large elevator and mill of brick and stone construction was totally destroyed by fire. The owner was convicted of arson,
and in his appeal to the State Supreme Court alleged that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.
The fire was discovered by a railroad special agent about 12:30 at
night. He noticed a small blaze, only about two feet high, on top of
1.

State v. Jacobson, 130 Minn., 347; 153 N.W., 145.
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the elevator. At the same time he saw the defendant walking across
the railroad tracks coming from the direction of the burning elevator.
When the fire department arrived, the fire was confined to the roof
of the elevator but was traveling very fast and in less than ten minutes
the elevator and mill was entirely involved in flames. Some of the
firemen, when entering the building, saw streamers of fire flashing with
a bright flame up and down on the brick wall separating the elevator
from the mill, and from the manner and speed with which the fire
burned and spread it was, they said, a "boosted" fire, that is, some
inflammable substance other than that of which the building was constructed or which it contained contributed to its burning and spreading.
A few minutes after the discovery of the fire, a man boarded a street
car about three blocks from the scene of the fire. He was identified as
the defendant by the motorman and two other passengers in the street
car who knew him well.
A few days before the fire an employee of a construction company
that was making some repairs to the elevator, purchased two fivegallon cans of kerosene for use in flares to warn traffic at night. He
serviced the flares on the evening of the night of the fire and then
placed the kerosene cans, which were almost full, in the elevator near
the front door as was his custom.
The day after the fire a five-gallon "Martin Ware" can was found
lodged against a log boom in the river a short distance from the elevator and which was identified as the same can that was used in the
elevator to fill the water barrels for fire protection purposes. There
was a small quantity of fluid in the can which a chemical analysis showed
to be kerosene.
On the evening of the night of the fire, when the elevator was shut
down for the night, the machinery was inspected to be sure there were
no hot boxes, and the main switch which cuts off all electric current
from the building, was shut off, and all doors and windows were locked.
The building was very clean and free from dust, and there was absolutely nothing in the building to cause an accidental fire.
The defendant, according to his own admission, was in desperate
financial circumstances when the fire occurred. He owed $7,000.00 back
taxes on the property. There were a number of judgments and liens
against the property for labor and material. He was also four or five
months behind in his rent on his apartment, and he owed numerous
other bills. He had not paid the premiums on his fire insurance. Some
of the insurance companies had written him advising him that their
policies would be cancelled upon the expiration of ten days from the
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receipt of the written notice. The elevator, however, was destroyed by
fire two days before the expiration of these notices.
The defendant claimed that he was not at the elevator after 4:30
on the afternoon of the day before the fire, but he was seen leaving
there about 7':00 P.M., the night of the fire by a man employed at a
,nearby mill who knew him well. He saw the defendant come out of the
side door, try the door to see if it was locked, and then walk rapidly
away.
After the fire defendant made a statement to the fire marshal in
which he denied that he had been in the vicinity of the building at or
about the time that the fire occurred. His story under oath to the fire
marshal was that he left the elevator at 4:30 P.M.; that he went
directly home, had dinner with his family and then went to a wrestling
match. After the wrestling match he went to a night club where he
remained for about an hour and a half, and then he went home arriving
about 12:30. He did not know anything about the fire until the next
morning about 8:00-o'clock when he read it-in the paper.
At his trial the defendant testified in his own behalf, and on the witness stand admitted that his previous statement to the fire marshal was
a deliberate falsehood, and that he did board a certain street car near
the elevator just about the time the fire was discovered. He also
admitted that he had not been at a night club that evening. He claimed
that after the wrestling match he went to two hotels to see if he could
find someone who would give him a free ride to a nearby city and then
boarded the street car. His explanation of why he lied to the fire marshal was that he did not want to let his wife know that he was so hard
up he had to beg for an automobile ride to the city where he wanted
to go, but he finally admitted that she knew all about his financial plight.
In sustaining defendant's conviction the State Supreme Court said,
"The circumstantial evidence abundantly justified conviction. That both
the corpus delicti and the guilt of defendant may be so proved is too
2
well established in this state to justify citation of authorities."
We all recognize that the evidence in this case was entirely circumstantial. Many of these circumstances, when standing alone, are inconclusive, but when each piece of evidence is placed in its proper position,
with relation to the others, they form a chain-strong, convincing,
conclusive.
It must be apparent to all by now that circumstantial evidence can
be as strong and convincing as direct evidence, and in some cases, more
2. State v. Milford Burton Lytle; decision No. 192 rendered by Minnesota Supreme Court,
Jan. 2. 1943.
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so. The gathering together of circumstantial evidence may be compared
to the piecing together of a picture puzzle which, after each part has
been fitted into its proper place, forms a picture complete in every detail.
The arson investigator should not allow himself to be discouraged
merely because the evidence he gathers in working up his case is mostly
circumstantial, as the nature of the crime is such that it must necessarily
be proved by this type of evidence. The investigator also should not
allow himself to be prejudiced by any of the false and misconceived
ideas that have sprung up regarding circumstantial evidence because, as
we have seen the law is, and the courts have so held, that circumstantial
evidence has just as much value in a legal sense as direct evidence.

